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Extensive research on risk perception has led to a received view (the psychometric model 
or paradigm), which stresses that members of the public react negatively to technology 
whenever it (a) is new, (b) causes “dread”, and (c) there is low trust in experts and 
organizations concerned with managing the risk. Experts, on the other hand, are said to be 
“objective” and unaffected by “subjective” factors. However, this research has used the 
same - misleading - methodology in almost all cases and the fact that some of the results 
have been “many times replicated” is therefore irrelevant to its validity. Analyses of the 
psychometric model have repeatedly shown that it leaves most of the variance of 
perceived risk and policy attitudes unexplained. A closer look at several decades' work 
shows that (a) novelty carries little weight in risk perception, (b) “dread” has not been 
measured in an appropriate manner and is little powerful, and (c) social trust has a 
marginal influence as compared to trust in science, epistemological trust. Furthermore, 
antagonistic attitudes are common and important. Experts exhibit the same structure and 
level of risk perception as the public; unless they assess risks, they are responsible for 
managing. In that case, they judge the risk to be drastically smaller than the public does. 
The importance of epistemic as opposed to social trust stresses the need to take peoples’ 
concern seriously, not only establish good social relations. The finding that antagonistic 
attitudes are common and important suggests that being “respectful of people’s feelings” 
will not be sufficient to establish trust. Failures of risk communication can probably be 
explained to some extent by the fact that practitioners rely on the misleading notions of 




Peoples' reactions to risky technologies have been in the focus of policy debates since the 
1960's. It appeared to many that risk was the key to understanding the policy problems. Early 
work by Starr showed that “real risk”, as measured by accident statistics, did not suffice to 
account for “societal acceptance” of technologies (Starr, 1969). Starr suggested that one must 
also take into account if activities involving such technologies are perceived as voluntary or 
not, and this suggestion stimulated a number of authors to speculate about somewhat different 
interpretations
3. The development of research on these matters during the 1970's did not lead 
                                                 
1 . Work supported by a grant from the Social Science Research Program of the Swedish Nuclear Fuel and Waste 
Management Co (SKB).  
 
2 . I am indebted to Peter Sandman and Andreea Vintila for their comments on the manuscript. 
3 . Traveling on a bus is safer that driving your own car by a factor of 10, but is hardly less “voluntary”.  
   4
to agreement about factors of perceived risk, but few if any questioned the relevance of 
focusing on risk rather than other possible dimensions. The stage was set for empirical 
research on perceived risk.  
 
It should be noted that initial work on risk perception was concerned with policy matters and 
related political attitudes, nuclear power policy being the prime example. However, later work 
on lifestyle risks, arising from risk-taking behavior, has shown that similar factors enter the 
picture as in the case of policy matters (Sjöberg, 2004b). The present paper will deal mostly 
with policy but what is said is largely relevant also for lifestyle risks. Health communication 
and risk communication are often treated within the same conceptual framework (McComas, 
2006).  
 
It is obvious that successful risk communication should be facilitated by knowing how people 
think about risks. On the other hand, if such knowledge is faulty or incomplete, 
communication is hampered. Since the risk communication literature mainly relies on the 
psychometric paradigm, the present paper will analyze that paradigm critically and in detail. 
The agenda of a recent symposium on risk communication, organized by the US National 
Science Foundation, states: 
 
“Research in risk perception has been guided by the psychometric paradigm. From its beginning, 
this approach was fundamentally quantitative and empirically driven, with theories arising from 
analyses of observations and experiments. Agreement exists regarding the importance to risk 
perception of specific factors such as information context, uncertainty, trust, control, voluntariness, 
and emotional response.” (<http://www.ramas.com/riskcomm1.htm#agenda>, retrieved May 13, 
2006).  
 
Ropeik  (Ropeik, 2004) is an example of the many papers which summarize the psychometric 
model and presents a list of the traditional risk attributes claimed to be important for 
understanding risk perception. And, as so many others, it does so without a hint that the model 
may be misleading. One of the best-known risk consultants, Peter Sandman, based his 
“outrage” model on the factors specified in the Psychometric Model (P. M. Sandman, 1987; 
P. M Sandman, 1989; P. M. Sandman, 1993; Weinstein & Sandman, 1993). Sandman's work 
is impressive and stimulating, but it is limited by its reliance on a model, which only explains 
risk perception in a very limited sense, as we shall see. 
 
It is of course not claimed here that the psychometric paradigm is the sole basis for risk 
communication in theory and practice. It is clear, however, that it is an important part of 
current thinking about risk perception and risk communication.  
 
The psychometric paradigm was initiated in 1978 in a paper proposing the Psychometric 
Model of risk perception (Fischhoff, Slovic, Lichtenstein, Read, & Combs, 1978). The model 
implied, or so it seemed, that perceived risk was strongly determined by two factors: novelty 
and dread. Nuclear power was, at the time, perceived as new, and dreaded. This finding 
appeared to explain the strong negative reactions to nuclear technology. Similar conclusions 
were drawn about other kinds of more or less hazardous technologies.  
 
The psychometric model exists in at least three different versions, depending on which 
attributes of hazards are included. The most common version is probably the one discussed 
here, which is based on factor analysis of the attributes, amounting to the two over-arching 
factors of novelty and dread. The original lists of attributes included several aspects which 
may have been forgotten by some researchers and practitioners. Sandman stressed this point   5
(personal communication, May 18, 2006) and his original 12 outrage components, which 
include fair-unfair, morally relevant - morally irrelevant and natural-industrial, as well as 
some which seem somewhat less interesting such as memorable - not memorable 
 
Around 1990, results were published on social trust, which was suggested as another powerful 
determinant of perceived risk (Slovic, Flynn, & Layman, 1991). These results, together with 
the original model, could be summed up as implying that people's reactions to hazardous 
technologies were dependent on how they perceived core properties of the technologies 
(novelty and dread), and how much they trusted experts and organizations responsible for risk 
management with regard to these technologies.  
 
In current discourse, affective reactions and feelings are held to be of great importance for 
understanding risk perception (Loewenstein, Weber, Hsee, & Welch, 2001). Part of the 
support for this statement comes from the traditional concept of dread. Part of it comes from 
the newer work on an “affect heuristic” (Finucane, Alhakami, Slovic, & Johnson, 2000), 
which is based on the solid evidence for a correlation between attitudes and perceived risk. 
People with a positive attitude to an object also tend to perceive that it is of low risk. The 
bridging of this finding with the dread concept is done by widening the meaning of the word 
affect to include also attitude, creating considerable coinfusiuo9n (Sjöberg, 2006). See Fig. 1 











Fig. 1. The received psychometric model/paradigm of trust and risk acceptance.  
 
The psychometric paradigm also considers the difference between experts and the public. It is 
well known that experts' risk assessments often diverge dramatically from the risk perceived 
by members of the public. A small group of risk assessment experts was studied within the 
psychometric paradigm and it was found that their risk assessments were in good agreement 
with the facts, and different from those of members of the public (Slovic, Fischhoff, & 
Lichtenstein, 1979).  
 
The results within the psychometric paradigm appeared to be very much common sense and 
were readily accepted as giving a correct analysis of perceived risk and related attitudes. 
Another reason for their acceptance was probably the very high correlations reported between 
perceived risk and the psychometric factors (dread and novelty) - in the neighborhood of 0.8 
when calculated for mean ratings. It was probably not generally realized that means, when 
estimated across a large sample of individuals, have much less random error than individual 
values and therefore can be expected to be more readily accounted for than individual values
4. 
                                                 
4 . This fact is well known in social science, and has been termed the “ecological error” (Robinson, 1950).   6
When the latter were analyzed, the correlation level dropped from 0.8 to about 0.2
5 (Gardner 
& Gould, 1989; Sjöberg, 2002b).  
 
However, later work has not supported the basic tenets of the psychometric paradigm. In the 
present paper, I develop a critical analysis of the psychometric paradigm and illustrate some 
of my points with new results from an ongoing survey study of risk perceptions and attitudes 
to a nuclear waste repository. These data were obtained in 2005-2006 from random samples in 
three Swedish municipalities, as well as a national sample, using a mailed survey. About 2000 
respondents took part in the study. The response rate was about 51 percent. The three 
municipalities were Östhammar and Oskarshamn, where there is currently a study of 
feasibility for siting a repository, and Finspång, which was used as a control community. They 
are all small communities, population about 25 000 each, situated in the middle and south of 
Sweden 
 
Critical analysis of the psychometric paradigm 
 
Several points should be stressed. 
 
1.  It is not obvious that risk is the most powerful explanatory concept when it comes to 
accounting for policy attitudes
6. Risk has two facets: probability and consequences. 
The probability of a negative event is closely related to perceived risk, but policy 
attitude, such as demand for mitigation, is mostly related to the severity of 
consequences (Sjöberg, 1999a). This finding is related to Sunstein's concept of 
probability neglect (Sunstein, 2002, 2003) and to the currently commonly applied and 
much debated precautionary principle. One of the primary aspects of severity of 
consequences if that of substitutability. An important technology, which cannot easily 
be substituted, tends to be accepted, given that risk is at a low level (Sjöberg, 2002c). 
Current debates about nuclear power show, in many countries, how this works: 
nuclear power is being reinstated because it has been managed well and without 
accidents, and because substitutes are expensive or environmentally harmful. 
  
2.  Furthermore, there are risks and risks. We found very early in our empirical work that 
people make a very clear distinction between risks to themselves (personal risks) and 
to others (general risks) (Sjöberg & Drottz, 1987). Weinstein had discovered this 
earlier, of course, and wrote about unrealistic optimism (Weinstein, 1980). We found 
that personal risk was as important as general risk with regard to policy attitudes 
toward the environment and technology related hazards. For life-style risks, general 
risk was more important (Sjöberg, 2003a) We also found that non-specified risk, i. e. 
when no target for the risk is explicitly stated, as practiced in the psychometric 
paradigm, was judged in very much the same way as general risk (Sjöberg, 2003a). 
Hence, the psychometric tradition got a wrong start by studying the type of risk least 
relevant for policy issues.  
 
                                                 
5 . One of the more surprising twitches of the debate about risk perception models is the argument that 
correlations are inadequate to measure the strength of a relationship, see my discussion in Sjöberg (Sjöberg, 
2003b). Correlations are of course suitable in all ordinary applications where it is desired to test how well one or 
several independent variables account for a dependent variable – the typical application in testing models and 
theories.  
6 . Attitudes to policy issues, such as siting a waste repository in one’s municipality.   7
3.  The two basic Psychometric Model dimensions of novelty and dread fail to account 
for much of the variance of perceived risk. In particular, there is no solid evidence that 
novelty is a factor in risk policy attitudes or even in perceived risk. Dread may, or may 
not, be of some importance but a close look at the definition of dread shows that it is 
measured wholly, or mostly, with non-emotional components which can be best 
summarized as measuring the perceived severity of consequences (Sjöberg, 2003d). 
The dread variable, by itself, is not a powerful explanatory concept. This finding does 
not imply that emotions are not important in risk perception, only that the evidence for 
their importance is lacking in the psychometric paradigm. More about this later.  
 
4.  Social trust is a rather weak factor in risk perception and related attitudes (Sjöberg, 
1999b). Two other dimensions have turned out to be more important: epistemological 
trust and antagonism (Sjöberg, 2001, 2004a; Sjöberg & Herber, in press). People are 
suspicious about a technology when they doubt that the scientific basis of risk 
assessments of that technology is not solid enough. They are also suspicious when 
they believe that it is being implemented in the interests of others who do not care 
about their welfare or are even hostile to it.  
 
Trust in science, or epistemic trust, is more important than social trust (Sjöberg & 
Herber, in press). This conclusion is based on regression analysis. Simple frequency 
data tell the same story. As much as 28 percent in my recent nuclear waste study 
answered that a repository could have negative effects unknown today (to a large or a 
very large extent). Only 7 percent believed that it could have positive effects unknown 
today.  
 
Perceptions of antagonistic interests in society are common. Risk communicators have 
at times been naive in assuming, more or less implicitly, that people share the goals 
and values of industry and/or politicians in power. The question about antagonistic 
interest was posed in the present study. For nuclear industry, 26 percent stated that it 
was rather, much or completely antagonistic to the interests of the respondent. The 
value was lower for regulatory authorities (about 18 percent) but still large.  
 
A related aspect of importance is the very common feeling among members of the 
public that they have no influence on policy (Sjöberg, 1996b, 1997). Such a feeling 
leads to alienation and rejection of proposed policies. In the national sample, 40 
percent stated that they had rather or very small possibilities to influence policy on 
nuclear waste in their municipality. The number was about 10 percent lower in 
Oskarshamn and Östhammar, but still large enough to form a cause for concern.  
 
5.  Experts have risk perceptions, too. These risk perceptions are not very different in 
structure from those entertained by the public. Experts are people, and though their 
risk assessments are the best we have, they need to be taken with a grain of salt. In our 
work we have found that experts make much lower risk judgments of a technology 
whenever their professional role involves a responsibility for handling that very 
technology, but not otherwise (Sjöberg, 2002a). For example, a group of experts on 
nuclear waste and ionizing radiation made very low risk judgments of all matters 
related to nuclear technology but judged radon gas (another radiation risk, and a 
natural hazard) to be as dangerous as the public judged it (Sjöberg & Drottz-Sjöberg, 
1994). Another example comes from our work on food related risks (Sjöberg, 2003b). 
Experts distinguished very clearly between risks, which were the responsibility of   8
individual consumers, and risks with which they had some professional connection. 
Only the latter risks were judged as very much smaller than the public did (Sjöberg, 
Oskarsson, Bruce, & Darnerud, 1997). Hence, experts' risk judgments are probably 
different from those of the public not only due to their knowledge. Experts may have 
become experts because of a self-selection process involving low perceived risk to 
begin with. We found high-school students to exhibit risk perception strongly 
correlated with line of study (Drottz-Sjöberg & Sjöberg, 1991). Once the process of 
advanced study and later socialization in a work environment sets in, these tendencies 
can be expected to increase in strength. After all, who can and wants to survive in an 
environment, which you see as destructive to your fellow human beings? 
 
The role of emotions re-assessed 
 
Traditional arguments within the psychometric paradigm for the importance of emotions are 
misleading for two reasons. First, the “dread” factor mostly measures non-emotional items 
and the emotion word used (dread) has by itself only weak explanatory power. Second, work 
on “affect” has been cited in an overly simplistic manner (Loewenstein et al., 2001); see a 
discussion of the ambiguous use of the word affect (Sjöberg, 2006). Attitude toward a 
technology does correlate with perceived risk, but that does not mean that emotions in the 
proper sense of the word have thereby been demonstrated to be of importance. Attitude is 
essentially a matter of evaluation in contemporary psychology (Alabarracín, Johnson, & 
Zanna, 2005). The importance of emotions is quite a different matter.  
 
The typical “dread” item of the psychometric paradigm asks for a judgment of one emotional 
reaction, dread. There is no specification of the current emotional reaction of the respondent, 
nor about whose emotional reaction is to be judged (Fischhoff et al., 1978). These conditions 
may partly explain why the item lacks explanatory power. In current work, I measured 
emotional reactions by the following instruction: 
 
“Make a fast and spontaneous assessment of your feeling about a nuclear waste repository in 
your municipality”. 
 
















Note that most of these terms are negative, in accordance with emotion theory (Izard, 1977). 
The emotion ratings were used to form two indices, one of positive and one of negative 
                                                 
7 . There is good evidence that interest is an emotion (Silvia, 2006). 
8 . Used to measure the basic hedonic mood and emotion dimension (Sjöberg, Svensson, & Persson, 1979).   9
emotions. The means (standardized) of the rated emotional reactions to a local repository are 

















Figure 2. Mean rated emotions in four samples. Standardized values. 
 
Note the large, indeed dramatic, differences between the two municipalities where siting work 
is under way, and the rest of the country. Inserting emotion factors in a model of attitude to 




Figure 3. Model of the attitude to a repository. The numbers are standardized regression coefficients. 
 
 
Note that emotion factors were the most important ones, followed by epistemic trust, 
perceived risk and attitude to nuclear power, in that order. Social trust carries very little 
explanatory power in the model. Additional analyses showed that novelty and dread added 
nothing or very little to the model. Note also that attitude to nuclear power is an important 
explanatory variable. It is a frequent finding that attitudes reflect a common underlying image, 
which finds its expressions in diverse response modes, such as beliefs and values (Sjöberg & 























Model of attitude 
to the repository 
explaining 65 percent 
of the variance   10
A closer look at all 11 emotion factors showed that the most important
9 emotion factor was 
anger, not fear. Fear and satisfaction (hedonic response) were about equally important, and 
clearly less so than anger. The total set of 11 emotion factors accounted for 63 percent of the 
variance of attitude to a local repository. A few simple questions about emotional reactions 
were thus sufficient to model attitude. Adding the traditional “dread” item increased 
explanatory power by only 1 percent. Anger was found to be important also in a study of 
reactions to the attack on the WTC in 2001 (Lerner, Gonzalez, Small, & Fischhoff, 2003), but 
in that study positive emotions were not investigated, for obvious reasons. The prominence of 
anger is in line with Sandman's “outrage” model.  
 
The importance of the target (who is having the emotional reactions) was further clarified in a 
follow-up study where the respondents were asked to rate their own emotional reaction to the 
concept of nuclear power, as well as the reactions of others to the same concept. The 
correlations between emotional reactions and attitude to nuclear power are given in Table 1. It 
is seen that correlations are quite strong with one’s own emotional reaction, about zero with 
the emotional reaction expected from others.  
 
Table 1. Correlations between emotional reactions and the attitude to nuclear power. 
Emotion  Own emotional reaction to 
nuclear power 
The anticipated emotional 
reaction of others to nuclear 
power 
Anger  -0.62  -0.08 
Contempt  -0.55  -0.10 
Fear  -0.65  -0.06 
Interest  0.28  0.17 
Sadness  -0.58  -0.12 
Satisfaction  0.57  0.21 
Guilt  -0.25  0.03 
Shame  -0.29  0.04 
Worry  -0.61  -0.12 
 
The systematic difference between one’s own emotional reaction and that attributed to others 
is also illustrated in Fig. 4, where mean the two sets of mean rated emotional reactions are 
plotted. The emotional reactions of others are rated as much stronger than one’s own, a 
finding, which resembles, to some extent, the common finding that personal risk is rated as 
lower than general risk. It may also throw some light on the common notion that the public 
will “panic”, often argued by representatives of authorities who tend to refrain from providing 
information to the public for that reason.  
 
                                                 
9 . Important in the sense of being strongly correlated with attitude.    11
Own emotional reaction

































Figure 4. Mean emotional reactions attributed to others vs. own reactions. 
 
Summing up, emotions can be powerful explanatory factors of attitudes and risk perception, 
but how they are measured is crucially important. The fact that there is a moderately strong 
and consistent relationship between emotional reactions and risk perception is documented in 
our work as reported elsewhere (Drottz-Sjöberg & Sjöberg, 1990; Sjöberg, 1998b). 
 
The psychometric paradigm: conclusions 
 
Several shortcomings of the psychometric paradigm are fairly obvious (Sjöberg, 1996a, 
2003c). When data are analyzed in an appropriate manner, it is clear that the model accounts 
for, at the most, 20-25% of the variance of perceived risk and risk tolerance
10. The strong 
explanatory power claimed for the model is based on misleading data analysis using means.  
 
The data on experts (Slovic et al., 1979), cited so frequently, has turned out, on closer 
examination, to be very weak as evidence (Rowe & Wright, 2001). Only 15 experts were 
studied, and their claim to expertise is very dubious. When real experts in a chosen field were 
analyzed, as I recently did for the case of nuclear waste (Sjöberg, 2002a) and genetic 
engineering (Sjöberg, 2004b), they turned out to give risk ratings which were explicable by 
the psychometric model dimensions in a manner similar to those of other respondents. 
Experts' risk perception was correlated with risk characteristics in a similar manner as in the 
case of the publiuc’s risk perception.  
 
Social trust is a fairly weak explanatory variable with regard to perceived risk. The present 
results support that statement and suggest that epistemic trust is more important than  social 
trust. 
 
The psychometric paradigm neglects important distinctions and variables. People make quite 
different judgments of personal and general risk, see for example Drottz-Sjöberg (Drottz-
Sjöberg, 1993). Personal and general risk differ both in level (personal risk is usually judged 
as much lower than general risk) and in correlates. General risk is a better predictor of policy 
attitudes for lifestyle risks such as alcohol, while personal risk is more or equally important 
                                                 
10 . Occasionally, higher values are obtained, especially for nuclear technology.   12
for technology and environment risks perceived as being outside of our individual control, 
such as nuclear power (Sjöberg, 2000a).  
 
The model does not take into account the powerful dimension we have called tampering, or 
interfering, with nature (Sjöberg, 2000b), nor does it treat vested economic interest. It also 
does not account for the weak relationship between rated "risk" and policy attitudes, such as 
demand for risk mitigation. The latter dimension is hard to explain with risk data but so far it 
has been found to be most strongly related to expected consequences rather than probabilities 
or risks (Sjöberg, 1993, 1998a, 1999a). The latter finding is true whether hazards are defined 
as activities or consequences, as shown in the present paper and elsewhere (Sjöberg, 1999c). 
The psychometric paradigm is founded on the presumption that activities are important for 
risk policy attitudes. The present data, and data in the cited references, strongly support the 
notion that consequences are much more important.  
 
In the present study, 24 attributes of risks were used, some of them not considered in any 
version of the Psychometric Model known to me. The most important attributes, emerging 
from a regression analysis of attitude to a local repository, were, in that order: 
 
Harm to children and future generations 
Decreasing real estate prices 
Negative effects unknown today 
Effects which will increase over time 
 
The fit of a model is of course not the same thing as practical value of attributes in a risk 
communication situation. Yet, it seems likely that attributes which carry most weight in 
models also are quite important in communication situations. 
 
 
Despite its important shortcomings, the psychometric paradigm has become an attractive basis 
for most current work on risk perception, both research and consulting. The question I pose 
here is why. A few suggestions are offered as answers: 
 
•  The model is very simple. It is very easy to understand and is close to "common 
sense". 
 
•  The model provides answers which are politically desirable. The public is depicted as 
emotional and ignorant, just as policy makers have always suspected. In contrast, 
experts are said to make the objectively correct risk judgments.  
 
•  The model seems to supply a final answer. As we have seen above, the model has been 
popularized with the help of a kind of data analysis which can hardly fail to provide 
the impression that risk perception is explained. Furthermore, it gives replicable data, 
probably because it benefits from common semantics of risk and related concepts in 
various groups and even nations or cultures. Similar semantic overlap has been noted 
before, e.g. with Osgood's semantic differential (Osgood, Suci, & Tannenbaum, 1957).  
 
Other aspects may also be involved, but those mentioned above carry the Psychometric 
paradigm a long way.   13
 
Implications for risk communication 
 
There seems to be consensus on risk communication being difficult and frequently a failure 
(Bier, 2001). Let me suggest reasons why this should be the case, to the extent that risk 
communication relies on the received message from the psychometric paradigm: 
 
1.  Emphasis on probability. Probabilities are usually of little concern to the public who 
finds them hard to understand, based on questionable assumptions, and irrelevant. 
Consequences are what should addressed, not probabilities. Compare the current 
concerns with the precautionary principle. In my recent project on nuclear waste, there 
were several questions about precaution. Consider the following one: 
 
“A technical solution to the disposal of spent nuclear fuel which maybe can have serious risks 
should be avoided if it can not be proven that it is risk free”. 
 
A large majority agreed, 81 percent, only 6 percent rejected the statement. Several other 
results of the study likewise supported the precautionary principle. People do not like the idea 
of a trade-off between risk and benefit. The statement 
 
“A technical solution to the disposal of spent nuclear fuel which maybe can have serious risks 
should be should be accepted if it is found that the benefits are larger than the risks”. 
 
It was accepted by only 26 percent of the respondents. 
 
A closer look at precaution was obtained by pooling the 15 items into a composite score (after 
reversing 4 of them). The score had a skewed distributions; many more gave extreme high 
responses than extreme low responses: 20.2 percent endorsed precautionary values strongly 
while only 1.3 percent rejected them strongly.  
 
The data thus show that there was a prevalence of precautionary attitudes in the studied 
samples. This does not mean, of course, that people always are in favor of precaution - there 
must surely be some small hazards we are ready to simply dismiss. Apparently the hazards of 




2. Trust. Social trust, the kind of trust usually discussed in the literature, is a relatively 
weak factor compared to epistemic trust. People say that they may well trust experts 
and organizations, still do not accept the policy they recommend because they are not 
convinced that scientific knowledge can be trusted - they feel it may be changed in the 
near future when new results are obtained. Epistemic trust may be called for when 
people use central processing of information, as should be expected with important 
issues. With less important issues, social trust may be more important because people 
use peripheral processing. The central vs peripheral aspect is extensively discussed in 
the literature on attitude change (Petty & Cacioppo, 1986).  
 
3. Neglected  dimensions. The Psychometric Model neglected to study the dimension 
“Interfering with Nature” and the related notions about “God's intentions”. Many 
people believe that it is immoral and dangerous to change Nature, as given to us by   14
God. The model also neglects economics; many people have personal economic 
interests pro or con a siting issue.  
 
4.  The role of emotions. Emotions are important, but not only fear. Anger is more 
important, and positive emotions also enter the picture. Emotions as experienced by 
the person him- or herself are more important than  emotions believed to be true of 
others, which is the type of emotions studied in the psychometric  paradigm.  
   
 
5. Ideologies. People have similar reactions to a number of social policies. In Sweden, 
there is endless controversy regarding nuclear power, membership in the European 
Union and genetically modified food. Preferences and attitudes regarding such matters 
are closely related to political preferences - which are usually not studied in the 
Psychometric Paradigm. Fig. 5 shows the variation in attitude to a local repository 
across preferences for the 7 political parties currently represented in Swedish 
Parliament. The difference between the two extremes amounts to almost 1 standard 
deviation, a “very large” difference in Cohen's standard terminology
11 (Cohen, Cohen, 


























It should be noted that the ordering of the parties is only partially coinciding with the 
traditional left-right dimension, or socialist versus non-socialist. Both the Center Party and the 
Christian Democrats are non-socialist parties, yet found here to the left of the Social 
Democrats. It is interesting to note that Cultural Theory's notion of an egalitarian type 
(Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982) fits badly to the Swedish situation because egalitarians often 
support technology, including nuclear technology which was indeed first introduced by the 
Swedish Social Democrats, a party which is certainly egalitarian. Two other, and much 
smaller, egalitarian parties are skeptical of technology (the Left Party and the 
                                                 
11 . The differences across parties according to a one-way ANOVA is highly statistically significant, p<0.0005.   15
Environmentalists). It seems likely that ideology is important to risk policy and attitudes 
generally and not only in Sweden, but the details may differ depending on unique 
characteristics of any society. 
 
6. Morality. Morality has seldom been explored in the risk perception literature, although 
it was one of the first powerful factors we discovered in our initial risk research work 
which started in the middle of the 1970's (Sjöberg, in press, 1987) In an extensive 
empirical study of several different groups of people, morality was found to be a 
strong determinant of risk acceptance (Sjöberg & Winroth, 1986). “Outrage” arises 
especially if people perceive that an actor is imposing a risk on them for his or her 
own profit. In the present data, the judgment that the repository risk is immoral and 
unjust accounted for 35 percent of the variance in attitude, adding novelty and dread 
increased that number by 12 percent, significant but not very much. With risk to the 
municipality as dependent variable, morality accounted for 30 percent of the variance, 
novelty and dread added only 7 percent. Of course, other factors are also of 
importance but the present simple analyses do illustrate that the Psychometric Model's 
core dimensions are of secondary importance, at best. 
 
7.  Experts. Experts' risk assessments are not objective and never constitute a final truth. 
Too much trust in experts sets the stage for difficult risk communication because many 
people do not agree that science has the final answers in matters of risk. In addition, 
experts may well speak in favor of values, which differ from those of the public, but in 
veiled terms, and claim that they propose the “rational” solution to risk management 
problems.  
 
Summing up, risk perceptions are influenced by other factors than those specified by the 
psychometric model; risk and probability are not crucial for understanding demand for 
risk mitigation; experts are also influenced by the same factors as the public and do not 




Epilogue: How about risk communication? 
 
 
The received message and it implications are well summarized by Ropeik as follows: 
 
“Risk communication is more effective when it sets a modest goal: to accept that feelings 
are an important part of why people react to risks the way they do and to provide 
information about any given risk based on the psychological and emotional factors at work, 
in language relevant to and respectful of people’s feelings so that audiences are more 
trusting and receptive to the communicator’s message, thereby increasing its impact.” (p. 
5). 
 
The model implicit in such statements is depicted in Fig. 1. How well does risk 
communication based on the received model actually work? Narrative reviews, in 
themselves excellent [e. g. Bostrom and Lofstedt (Bostrom & Lofstedt, 2003)] give no 
information about the size of effects to expect. Sometimes there seems even to be negative 
or quite complex effects, since people value not only the process but also the outcomes 
(Arvai, 2003; Santos & Chess, 2003). Yet, according to Ropeik, there are “countless 
examples” of success (Ropeik, In press), a surprising statement in view of the less   16
enthusiastic assessment of the success with campaign designed to promote more healthy 
behavior (Noar, 2006). The complexity of risk communication is enormous, and many 
factors enter the picture. In spite of this, risk communication as a discipline seems to be 
assuming a rather constrained and limited view of the actors. The importance of epistemic 
as opposed to social trust stresses the need to take peoples’ concern seriously, not only 
establish good social relations. The finding that antagonistic attitudes are common and 
important suggests that being “respectful of people’s feelings” will not be sufficient to 
establish trust.  
 
A search of the literature reveals a bewildering number of inputs from an extremely wide 
range of disciplines. Interdisciplinary research is often held to be a good in itself, but the 
chance to find a powerful and yet simple theory, which could account for the major 
findings, seems slight, at the present time. Closer attention to empirical bases and 
conceptual clarity could still be of use.  
  
 
Please send any comments on this report to lsjoberg@fastmail.fm  
 
For related (and other) research, see http://www.dynam-it.com/lennart/ 
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